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Attaching Domestic Assets to Remedy
High Seas Pollution: Rule B and
Marine Debris
Jonathan M. Gutoff*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether originating at sea in the form of refuse from
merchant vessels and cruise liners, discarded nets from fishing
vessels, disintegrating fiberglass vessel hulls, or from land in the
form of discarded consumer packaging, as much of this
Symposium has demonstrated, pollution is a problem. It is a
problem the United States cannot possibly hope to solve on its
own. Nonetheless, given the importance of private actions in
helping to clean up U.S. territorial waters, a fair question is what
activists may be able to do through private litigation to help clean
up the high seas. The task appears daunting. Many of the
sources of pollution are large vessels on the high seas, while
producers and users of the materials that form the debris may
often be based on land. Whether on the high seas or land, many of
the producers or the ultimate users of the materials that form
marine debris will often have no physical connection to the United
States and will not have had any reason to know, much less
intend, for their products or actions to have any effect on the
United States. Accordingly, under the “minimum contacts” theory
of personal jurisdiction there is no basis for bringing those parties
into U.S. courts to regulate their conduct.1 As this Article will
demonstrate, however, federal procedure in maritime cases allows
for the assertion of jurisdiction over parties who are subject to
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law.
1. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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maritime claims and are not subject to personal jurisdiction in the
United States so long as the party over whom jurisdiction is
asserted has any form of personal property in a judicial district of
the United States.2 Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for
Admiralty or Maritime and Asset Forfeiture Actions provides for
something many law students and practitioners who recall firstyear civil procedure will assume to have vanished: quasi in rem
jurisdiction over defendants in cases within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the district courts.3 Parties responsible for marine
pollution may be understood to have committed maritime torts,
and victims of those torts have a claim within the admiralty
jurisdiction of the federal courts. To the extent the responsible
parties have personal property in the United States, Rule B would
allow a federal district court to assert jurisdiction over those
parties.4 While not a panacea, Rule B could be an important tool
in regulating marine pollution by foreign parties.
II. MARINE DEBRIS

A. A Very Brief Description
Marine debris comes in all forms and has numerous sources.
The forms vary in size, from containers and their contents washed
overboard to merchant vessels and microscopic particles of plastic
and fiberglass. Its immediate sources may be maritime, merchant
vessels losing cargo overboard to heavy weather or cruise ships
disposing of passenger and crew-generated trash and waste.
Alternatively, the sources can be land-based, including consumers
who throw away non-biodegradable trash, such as plastic bags or
six-pack holders. This paper does not, and cannot, attempt to
fully describe the production and use of plastic bags, six-pack
holders, and other sources of marine pollution. This could be
done; however, it is beyond my expertise to do so.
B. Marine Debris Effects
Whatever its source, marine debris does a number of
damaging things. It is harmful to marine life, including fish.
2. See FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY
(2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.

AND
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Larger forms, such as nets, plastic bags, and six-pack rings, can
choke and trap animals. Smaller forms can be ingested, affecting
the health of the animals and affecting other animals further up
the food chain, including human beings. In addition, it can
threaten navigation by fouling propellers, rudders, and other
equipment, or sometimes vessel hulls. The damage can occur
anywhere on the high seas, in territorial water, or ashore. The
place where the damage occurs may be where the plastic or other
debris was manufactured, marketed, or used; some other state; or
not within a state at all but rather on the high seas. Clearly then,
the manufacturer may neither be located, doing business in, or
targeting activities in the place where the damage is done. This
presents problems for exercising jurisdiction over manufacturers,
marketers, and users of materials that turn up as marine debris
in the United States or on the high seas.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

A. Background: The Requirement of Geographic Power
One of the problems of any type of enforcement action is that
before a money judgment or order can issue against a party, the
issuing court must have jurisdiction over that party. Since the
decision in Pennoyer v. Neff,5 a state’s assertion of jurisdiction
over a party has been subject to the limits of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Under Pennoyer’s
formulation of the requirements of due process, which lasted until
the 1940s, there were only three bases for a court’s assertion of
jurisdiction: presence, consent, and presence of property.7 A
party had to be present in a state, consent to suit in the state, or
have property within the state at the commencement of the
action.8 According to the Pennoyer Court, the Due Process Clause
did not permit a state to reach outside of its borders to assert
jurisdiction over a party.9
With an increasingly mobile domestic economy, the Pennoyer
formulation proved to be increasingly problematic as the
twentieth century progressed. Courts developed fictions implying
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 724–25.
Id.
Id. at 722.
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consent10 and expanded the notion of corporate presence.11
Whatever the merits of these approaches, Pennoyer would not
make it past the first half of the twentieth century.
B. Minimum Contacts
1.

The Expansion of Jurisdictions Over Persons

In International Shoe Company v. Washington,12 the Supreme
Court reformulated the requirements for a court to exercise
jurisdiction over a party. The Court considered Washington’s
efforts to collect tax owed by International Shoe, which had a sales
force in Washington, but did not have a corporate presence
there.13 Upholding Washington’s assertion of jurisdiction, the
Court concluded that a state could assert jurisdiction over a nonpresent defendant if there were minimum contacts among the
defendant, the forum state, and the cause of action to “satisfy
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”14
Following International Shoe, there have been many similar
cases that should be familiar to the first-year law student. While
the jurisprudence is far from a model of clarity, it is possible to
present, for the purposes of this Article, a concise summary of the
current state of the law.
International Shoe gave rise to viewing the law of personal
jurisdiction as two categories, general and specific.15 A court has
general jurisdiction over a party when it may assert jurisdiction
over any claim against a party, whether or not related to the
party’s activities in the forum’s location.16 For a natural person to
be subject to the general jurisdiction of a court, she must have
actual physical presence,17 or residence in the forum state.18 The
basis of general jurisdiction over a corporation may be the
corporation’s place of incorporation or, in the words of the
10. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927).
11. See Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914).
12. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
13. Id. at 313.
14. Id. at 316.
15. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014) (citing Int’l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 318).
16. Id.
17. Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 619
(1990).
18. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
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Supreme Court, where it is “at home,” usually its principle place of
business.19
A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a party when the
court has jurisdiction over a particular claim against that party.20
For a party not present in a state, there must be a sufficient
relationship among the defendant, the claim, and the state to
provide the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the
requirements of “substantial justice and fair play.”21 In order to
do this, the defendant must have intentionally availed itself of the
jurisdiction of the forum, such as intentionally sending a product
into the forum jurisdiction that causes harm.22 On the other
hand, if the product is neither intentionally nor knowingly sent
into the forum, either because it was sold through a different legal
entity, or because it was incorporated into another product made
by a third party before it was sent into the jurisdiction, the fact
that the product may have caused harm in the forum will not be
sufficient to subject its manufacturer to jurisdiction.23 Thus,
19. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (internal citations omitted). This is a
fairly major change in understanding from the late twentieth century.
Following International Shoe, some courts interpreted nearly any act of doing
business within a state as sufficient to subject the party to the state’s general
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mackensworth v. Am. Trading Transp. Co., 367 F.
Supp. 373, 376 (1973) (considering a motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction, where plaintiff’s claim of jurisdiction was based on the single
voyage of a merchant vessel to the forum state, and concluding, “[a]nd so we
now must look to the facts to see if due process is met by sufficient ‘minimum
contacts.’ The visit of defendant’s ship is not yet very old, and so we feel
constrained to hold that under traditional notions of substantial justice and
fair play defendant’s constitutional argument does not carry the day”)
(footnotes omitted).
20. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011)
(“The question is whether a defendant has followed a course of conduct
directed at the society or economy existing within jurisdiction of a given
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the defendant to
judgment concerning that conduct.”).
21. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (“The inquiry
whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation.”) (internal quotations omitted).
22. See Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (“[Defendant] purposefully shipped at least ninety-four [of its] products
to Delaware retailers, fully expecting that its products would then be sold in
Delaware as a result of its activities.”); Brown v. Bottling Group, LLC, 159 F.
Supp. 3d 1308, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (“[and Defendant] manufactured
products in anticipation of sales in Florida, [defendant] used an exclusive
U.S. distributor to complete shipment of products to Florida.”).
23. See J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 886.
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where an English company made a metal shredder that it
marketed to the United States through a separate distributor, and
the shredder harmed a metal worker in New Jersey, the New
Jersey court (as opposed to the United States as a federal entity)
could not assert jurisdiction over the manufacturer.24
2.

Jurisdiction Based on Property

While International Shoe and its progeny expanded the
jurisdiction of states to parties outside of their territorial
boundaries, it is widely understood to have reduced the scope of
jurisdiction over property within a state’s territorial boundaries.25
While the Pennoyer Court established that presence of property in
a state was grounds for that state to assert jurisdiction over an
absent party up to the amount of the value of the property,26 in
Shaffer v. Heitner27 the Court announced that the use of property
within a state to assert jurisdiction over a person outside the state
would be subject to the same “minimum contacts” analysis as
when a state attempts to exercise jurisdiction directly over a
person.28
Thus, while the presence of property within a state may
provide security of a claim—a court may attach the assets of a
defendant before trial to secure any eventual judgment—the
common understanding of Shaffer is that a court cannot use the
presence of property within a state to secure jurisdiction over a
defendant whom the Due Process Clause would otherwise place
outside of the court’s jurisdiction.29
C. Jurisdiction Over Parties Responsible for Marine Debris
Given the state of the law of personal jurisdiction, it would
seem impossible to bring suit against many parties responsible for
marine debris that affect U.S. citizens, either on the high seas or
24. See id. at 886–87.
25. See Conn v. Zakharov, 667 F.3d 705, 719 (6th Cir. 2012) (“The
ownership of property in the State is a contact between the defendant and the
forum, and it may suggest the presence of other ties. Jurisdiction is lacking,
however, unless there are sufficient contacts to satisfy the fairness standard
of International Shoe.”) (citation omitted).
26. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 724–25 (1877).
27. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
28. See id. at 207–09, 212–13.
29. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exorbitant
Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474, 479–81 (2006).
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in U.S. waters. Many of those parties will have no presence in the
United States. They will have neither incorporation nor a
principle place of business in a state. Even if the damage the
debris causes is felt within U.S. waters, it is doubtful that any
parties causing it will have directed their actions toward the
United States. While many foreign actors may have assets in the
United States, in the form of bank accounts, securities, or
accounts payable, under Shaffer, unless the actors themselves are
present in the United States or have directed their actions there,
that property could not be used to drag them into a U.S. court.30
Under federal maritime law, however, the property of a foreign
corporation could be used to do just that. Whatever the correct
interpretation of Shaffer, or indeed, whether it is still good law
aside, both long before and long after Shaffer, federal admiralty
practice has allowed plaintiffs to assert jurisdiction over absent
defendants on the basis of presence of the absent defendant’s
property.31 The requirements for asserting jurisdiction based on
the presence of a defendant’s property are currently set out in
Rule B of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplemental
Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture
Actions. Because Rule B has survived Shaffer, and because it
provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction over maritime claims, it
may serve as a tool in asserting U.S. jurisdiction over some foreign
parties responsible for marine debris.
IV. MARITIME ATTACHMENT: JURISDICTION OVER PARTIES NOT
SUBJECT TO SERVICE OF PROCESS

A. Rule B
Attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction over an absent
party has been part of maritime practice since before the
foundation of the Republic.32 It was first codified in the Admiralty
30. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209.
31. See, e.g., Blueye Nav., Inc. v. Oltenia Nav., Inc., 1995 WL 66654, at
*1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1995) (“The rule is a formal recognition of the
common law principle that attachment of a defendant’s property was often
the only way to gain jurisdiction over an admiralty or maritime defendant.”).
32. See Atkins v. The Disintegrating Co., 85 U.S. 272, 303 (1874) (stating
that “[t]he use of the process of attachment in civil causes of maritime
jurisdiction by courts of admiralty . . . has prevailed during a period
extending as far back as the authentic history of those tribunals can be
traced”).

2017]

RULE B & MARINE DEBRIS

439

Rules promulgated by the Supreme Court in 1844.33 In 1966,
when admiralty cases, now subsumed with in “one form of civil
action”34 came to be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Supreme Court made maritime attachment part of
the Supplemental Rules. Rule B provides, in pertinent part:
If a defendant is not found within the district when a
verified complaint praying for attachment and the
affidavit required by Rule B(1)(b) are filed, a verified
complaint may contain a prayer for process to attach the
defendant’s tangible or intangible personal property—up
to the amount sued for—in the hands of garnishees
named in the process.35
The requirement that a defendant not be found in a district
has been interpreted to mean that the defendant either not be
subject to, or available for, service of process within the district.36
Thus, Rule B not only allows for process when a defendant is not
subject to service under the Due Process Clause, but, to a large
extent, the ability to take advantage of the Rule depends on the
defendant’s absence. How a completely absent defendant, against
whom the plaintiff has a maritime claim, can be brought into a
district with no relation to the claim is interesting considering
Shaffer.
B. Survival Post-Shaffer
As mentioned above, from the time it was handed down until
the present, Shaffer has been generally understood to have put an
end to quasi in rem jurisdiction where the res, the property that is
being attached, has nothing to do with the claim for which
jurisdiction is being asserted—what the Shaffer Court called quasi
in rem type II jurisdiction.37 Nonetheless, whatever the proper
understanding of Shaffer, Rule B has provided a robust example of
the survival of quasi in rem jurisdiction type II to the present day.
It is beyond the scope of this Symposium, or the interest of many
of its participants, to discuss whether or not Rule B has a sound
33. See Aqua Stoli Shipping Ltd. v. Gardner Smith Pty Ltd., 460 F.3d
434, 438 (2d Cir. 2006).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. B(1)(a).
36. See Stoli Shipping, 460 F.3d at 434.
37. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209 n.17.

440 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:432
theoretical basis, but it should suffice to note that no federal court
of appeals to have considered the issue has found that Rule B
violates the Due Process Clause;38 that for a time during the
previous decade, three decades after Shaffer, Rule B provided the
basis for nearly a third of the civil docket of the Southern District
of New York;39 and Rule B continues to provide a basis for
jurisdiction in maritime actions brought in federal courts.40 Rule
B is not going away and may be of use in combating marine
debris.
C. Requirements of Rule B
As a substantive matter, in addition to requiring that a
defendant not be “found within the district” where the action is
brought when the complaint is filed, Rule B requires that property
be in the hands of a garnishee in the district; and that the case be
brought in federal district court as a maritime case.41 It will be
useful to go through each of these requirements in turn.
1.

The Defendant Must Be “Not Found” Within the District

As set out above,42 the requirement of the defendant not being
found within the district at the time the action is commenced
means either that the defendant is not subject to service of process
within the district or that they cannot be found for service of
process.43
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in general make service
of process by a federal district court dependent on the ability of a
court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is
sitting.44 So, if there are not constitutionally sufficient contacts
between the state in which the district is sitting and the
defendant for general jurisdiction (contacts sufficient to make the
defendant “at home” in the state) or specific jurisdiction (sufficient
38. See, e.g., Williamson v. Recovery Ltd. P’ship, 542 F.3d 43, 50–51 (2d
Cir. 2008); Submersible Sys., Inc. v. Perforadora Cent., S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d
413, 419 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001); Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743
F.2d 956, 960 (1st Cir. 1984); Teyseer Cement Co. v. Halla Mar. Corp., 794
F.2d 472, 473 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. B(1)(a).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text.
43. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. B(1)(a).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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contacts among a defendant, the forum, and the claim along with
defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum state) a defendant
will not be subject to service in and will not “be found” in a district
in which the state is located.45 Moreover, even were a defendant
to be subject to service, if the plaintiff, after due diligence cannot
find the defendant within the district to properly effect service of
process, then the defendant would be “not found” in the district.46
2.

Personal Property in the Hands of a Garnishee

As set out in Rule B itself, the property subject to attachment
can be any sort of personal property, tangible or intangible.47 It
could be, as is typical of maritime practice, a vessel or cargo owned
by the defendant, but it could be, and often is, intangible property
such as accounts receivable, securities, or bank accounts.48 The
Rule B actions that formed so much of the Southern District of
New York’s business in the previous decade were based on the
seizure of electronic fund transfers (ETFs) as they passed through
the Southern District of New York.49 While the Second Circuit
eventually brought a halt to the Rule B attachments of ETFs, it
was not because the transfers were not property capable of being
attached. According to the Second Circuit, while the funds were
between the transferor bank and the transferee bank, they were
the property of neither the party making nor the party receiving
the transfer.
Thus, an action brought against either the
transferor or the transferee would not justify the attachment of
the funds between the transferor and transferee banks.50
3.

An Action Brought Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction

Rule B does not mention the requirement of admiralty
jurisdiction;51 however, by the terms of Rule A of the
Supplemental Rules, the supplemental rules are applicable in

45. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. B(1)(a).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Novoship (UK) Ltd. v. Ruperti, 567 F. Supp. 2d 501, 505
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that, “[i]t is difficult to imagine words more broadly
inclusive than tangible or intangible”) (citation omitted).
49. See id.
50. See Shipping Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585
F.3d 58, 72 (2d Cir. 2009).
51. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. B.
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“forfeiture action . . . under federal statute”; “statutory
condemnation proceedings”; and “the procedure in admiralty and
maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h).”52 This Article
will not bother considering the remote possibility of a party
responsible for marine debris being subject to either a statutory
forfeiture action or a condemnation procedure. Marine debris
claims may well come within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.
a.

Location

“[C]ases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction” are one of
the nine categories of cases or controversies brought within the
judicial power of the United States by Article III of the
Constitution,53 and Congress has given the district courts
jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case of admiralty or maritime
jurisdiction.”54 From very early on, it was understood that
whether a tort claim came with the admiralty jurisdiction
depended on location,55 and by the end of the nineteenth century
it was established that the location was the high seas or internal
waters navigable in interstate commerce.56 In 1948, to bring all
claims resulting from an allision of a vessel with land-based
structures within the admiralty jurisdiction, Congress extended
the admiralty jurisdiction to injuries on land “caused by a vessel
in navigable water.”57
52. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME CLAIMS R. A(1)(A)–(C).
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
54. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
55. See DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 440 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
56. See Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. 296, 336 (1857).
57. Admiralty Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 695, 62 Stat. 496 (1948)
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a) (2012)). The problem that
Congress was addressing was caused by different ways in which the common
law of most States and admiralty law treated fault on the part of the tort
victim. At common law, the general rule was that any contributory
negligence by the plaintiff barred the recovery. Maritime law, generally
applicable to maritime actions, had a system of equally divided damages.
Where a vessel hit a bridge causing damage to the bridge, on land, and to the
vessel, on a navigable water, the vessel owner’s claim against the bridge
owner (perhaps for failing to post the appropriate lights on the structure)
would not have been barred by the vessel owner’s fault (perhaps having the
vessel going at an unsafe speed) but would be subject to the rule of divided
damages. The bridge owner’s claim against the vessel owner, because it
would have been governed by common law, would have been barred by any
negligence on the bridge owner’s part. The Admiralty Extension Act brought
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Nexus

While the Admiralty Extension Act may have expanded the
scope of the admiralty “to keep the odd case in” its jurisdiction, a
quarter-century after its enactment the Supreme Court
articulated restrictions on the jurisdiction “to keep the odd case
out.”58 In a series of four cases,59 the Court held that for a tort to
come within the grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), in addition to taking
place on navigable waters, it must a have connection with
maritime activity, which is to be determined by looking at: (1) the
“general features” of the tort to determine whether it has “‘a
potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,’” and (2)
whether “‘the general character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the
incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity.’”60
c.

Nexus on the High Seas

All of the Supreme Court cases articulating the nexus
requirement have involved actions on inland waters within the
territory of the United States,61 and the Court has left open the
question of whether the nexus requirement applies to incidents on
the high seas.62 The high seas, however, unlike territorial waters
both claims within the admiralty jurisdiction and the regime of divided
damages. The law of admiralty has, as have many States, adopted a regime
of comparative fault. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S.
397, 411 (1975).
58. Jerome B. Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S.
527, 532 (1995).
59. See id. at 533–34 (discussing Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990));
Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982); Executive Jet Aviation,
Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
60. Id. at 534 (quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363–65, n.2).
61. Grubart involved pile-driving work in the Chicago River. 513 U.S. at
530. Sisson involved a fire aboard a yacht docked on the shores of Lake
Michigan. 497 U.S. at 36. Foremost involved a collision between two pleasure
boats on the Amite River in Louisiana. 457 U.S. at 670. Executive Jet
involved a plane crash into Lake Erie just off the shore from Cleveland. 409
U.S. at 251.
62. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
865 (1986) (noting the maritime nexus requirement that the wrong bears “a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activities” has been applied to
torts on navigable waters within the United States, but that the Court “need
not reach the question whether a maritime nexus also must be established
when a tort occurs on the high seas” as the ships in this case were clearly
involved in maritime commerce, which is a “primary concern of admiralty
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of the United States, have been viewed as a place where, as a
general matter, the substantive law of the states does not apply.63
Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that the Death on the
High Seas Act,64 which was enacted to give a claim for wrongful
death at a time when maritime law did not provide a remedy,
applies whether or not there is a maritime nexus involved in the
death.65 The question of federal interest impinging on state
interests does not arise on the high seas as it would in state
waters. Moreover, to the extent that admiralty law applies when
admiralty jurisdiction is present, there would be difficulties in
choosing an appropriate substantive law to apply to cases arising
on the high seas were the cases not subject to the admiralty
jurisdiction. For states, such as Virginia, that use lex loci delicti
as the choice of law principle for tort cases,66 if admiralty
jurisdiction were not to apply on the high seas, then it would be
hard to know which law to apply to a tort occurring there.
Because state law may not apply on the high seas, a court—state
or federal—must be able to look to maritime law for such cases,
and admiralty jurisdiction must apply to cases occurring on the
high seas.67

law”).
63. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 212, 214
(1986) (citations omitted).
64. Death on the High Seas Act, Pub. L. 109–304, 120 Stat. 1511,
amended by 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301–308 (2012).
65. See Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 219.
66. See Jones v. R.S. Jones Assoc., 431 S.E.2d 33, 34 (Va. 1993). Other
states that use lex loci as the basis for choice of law are: Alabama, Georgia,
Kansas, Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina and South Carolina. See
Lifestar Response of Ala., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 17 So. 3d 200, 213 (Ala.
2009); Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 582 S.E.2d 84, 86 (Ga. 2003); Aselco, Inc.
v. Hartford Ins. Grp., 21 P.3d 1011, 1020 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001); Hauch v.
Connor, 453 A.2d 1207, 1208 (Md. 1983); United Wholesale Liquor Co. v.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 775 P.2d 233, 234 (N.M. 1987); Gbye v. Gybe,
503 S.E.2d 434, 434 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Menezes v. WL Ross & Co., LLC,
744 S.E.2d 178, 182–83 n.2 (S.C. 2013).
67. See Robinson v. United States, 730 F.Supp. 551, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(concluding that a claim that an allegedly defective product caused harm on
the high seas was subject to the federal admiralty jurisdiction, and stating
that the “Executive Jet ‘nexus’ or ‘status’ analysis is appropriate only in that
borderline case where the fortuitous application of an admiralty situs would
oust state jurisdiction and rules of law. The case at bar involves a tort
occurring on the high seas, governed by theories of liability explicitly made a
part of the general maritime law . . . .”).
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Nexus in Admiralty Extension Act Cases

As noted above,68 Congress expanded the scope of admiralty
jurisdiction in 1948 to provide: “The admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States extends to and includes cases of
injury or damage, to person or property, caused by a vessel on
navigable waters, even though the injury or damage is done or
consummated on land.”69 Arguably, this is a self-contained grant
of jurisdiction, which depends only on the presence of (1) a vessel,
(2) on navigable waters, (3) causing injury or damage, (4) to
persons or property.
Under this reading of the Admiralty
Extension Act, the nexus requirement that the Supreme Court
deemed essential to the grant of jurisdiction over “any case of
admiralty or maritime jurisdiction” in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1333(1)70 is simply immaterial to cases under the Admiralty
Extension Act. On the other hand, it is possible to read the
Admiralty Extension Act as only extending the jurisdiction
granted in 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), in which case the element that the
vessel on navigable waters causes damage or injury would need to
have some potential to disrupt maritime commerce along with a
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.71
The question of whether cases brought in federal court need
the necessary maritime nexus has generated a split among
various federal district courts and courts of appeals,72 and this
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. 46 U.S.C.A § 30101(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
70. See supra Part IV.C.3.b.
71. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
72. Compare Tagliere v. Harrah’s Ill. Corp., 445 F.3d 1012, 1014, 1015
(7th Cir. 2006) (stating that the Admiralty Extension Act’s “purpose was
merely to make clear that accidents caused by boats on navigable waters are
within the admiralty jurisdiction even if the damage caused by the accident
was to something on the land[,]” and, when this “clear and simple
jurisdictional test” is met, then the maritime nexus test is not needed)
(citation omitted); St. Hilaire Moye v. Henderson, 496 F.2d 973, 977, 978–89
(8th Cir. 1974) (stating that the “strict locality test for admiralty [was]
extensively altered [by Executive Jet,]” and now admiralty jurisdiction
depends on “whether the accident arose out of a ‘traditional maritime
activity’”) (citation omitted); In re RQM, LLC, No. 10 CV 5520, slip op. 129 at
*6 (N.D. Ill. July 26, 2011) (stating that “[t]he Seventh Circuit has held that
the location test remains the only jurisdictional test when the tort in question
occurs on a boat”) (citation omitted); compare N. Assur. Co. of Am. v. Allied
Mason Contractors, Inc., Civ. Action No. 10 C 2197, slip op. 17 at *4 (N.D. Ill.
June 17, 2010) (citation omitted), with Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734
F.2d 767, 768 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that “[w]e have held that the
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Article will not attempt to resolve the issue. It is worth noting,
however, that while the issue is unresolved in many U.S. Courts of
Appeals, the western Great Lakes within the territory of the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits73 applies the Admiralty Extension
Act as a free-standing grant of jurisdiction. Along the Gulf Coast
states as well as the Atlantic coast of Florida and Georgia—the
territory of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits74—parties must show
that their claim arises from an incident with a potential to disrupt
maritime commerce and there is a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity.
V. THE APPLICATION OF RULE B TO PARTIES RESPONSIBLE FOR
MARINE DEBRIS

For parties responsible for marine debris who are not in the
United States, two aspects of Rule B are fairly straightforward.
First, if a party responsible for marine debris, for example the
manufacturer of non-degradable plastic bags or the owner of a
fleet of fishing vessels that abandons its nets, is neither
incorporated nor has its principle place of business in any state, it
will not be subject to service of process in any federal district.
Accordingly, if there is a claim within the admiralty jurisdiction
against the party and the party has any personal property,
tangible or intangible, in any district, that property could be
attached to obtain jurisdiction over and secure a judgment against
the party. One possible example might be a manufacturer of nondegradable plastic bags incorporated and with its principle place
application of [the Admiralty Extension Act] is limited by the principles . . .
which provide that admiralty jurisdiction requires that the wrong bear a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity”) (citation omitted);
Sohyde Drilling & Marine Co. v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 644 F.2d
1132, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that the Admiralty Extension Act “was
not intended to . . .
relieve [claimants] from jurisdictional constraints
unrelated to locality . . . imposed on general maritime tort claimants.
Accordingly, we find claims under [the Act] to be subject to the maritime
relationship rule of Executive Jet”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted); In re Christopher Columbus, LLC, Civ. Action No. 14-214 at *17–18
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2016) (stating “it is difficult to meaningfully reconcile the
Grubart Court’s acknowledgement that there is no categorical rule
establishing that there is admiralty jurisdiction over ‘every tort involving a
vessel on navigable waters’ with the type of categorical rule that Judge
Posner interpreted the [Admiralty Extension Act] as embodying”) (citation
omitted).
73. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
74. See id.
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of business in China (Company A). Assume that Company A has a
relationship with a company in Chicago (Company B) for some
other products not including the non-degradable plastic bags,
perhaps plastic packaging. If a claim within the admiralty
jurisdiction could be brought against Company A, the plaintiff in
the action could attach the payments owed by Company B to
Company A in the Northern District of Illinois.75 The second,
more difficult question that needs to be answered is whether there
is a maritime claim against the responsible party.
A. A Claim for Causing Marine Debris
The Supreme Court has recognized that products liability,
under negligence and strict liability theories, is part of maritime
law.76 Accordingly, a party who makes or distributes a product
that unreasonably causes harm to another through marine debris
may be held liable for the damage caused.77 Similarly, while
there are statutes covering marine pollution,78 marine pollution
has also been recognized as a tort.79 In either case of producing or
dumping the products that turn into marine debris, it may be hard
to identify the appropriate defender.
For producer and distributor defendants, it may be possible,
however, for plaintiffs to proceed on a market share theory of
liability, attaching liability to responsible parties in proportion to
their share of the market of the products that cause marine
debris. To be sure, while products liability law has been well
established in federal admiralty law, the same cannot be said for
market share liability.80 The Fifth Circuit has rejected the theory
for maritime torts,81 and whether any court outside that circuit
75. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 93(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327)
(defining the geographic extent of the Northern District of Illinois).
76. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
(1986).
77. Id. at 864–65.
78. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1952 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327) (This is a
federal law known as the NOAA Marine Debris Program.).
79. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1517 (D. Alaska 1991)
(holding that the oil spill in this case was a maritime tort subject to maritime
admiralty jurisdiction).
80. See In re Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 214
(5th Cir. 2010); Stark v. Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 371, n.4
(6th Cir. 2001) (noting that “[t]he plaintiff ha[d] provided no authority for an
admiralty action to proceed under a market-share liability theory”).
81. In re Bertucci Contracting Co. LLC, 712 F.3d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 2013)
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could be persuaded to adopt it is far from certain. On the other
hand, to the extent that fishermen would be the plaintiffs in cases
against those responsible for marine debris, it is possible that the
special solicitude shown by maritime law to fishermen82 could
persuade a court to adopt the theory.83
B. Damages – Fishermen Again
Assuming a proper defendant, or group of defendants, can be
identified, a plaintiff in a maritime tort action, as in any other,
needs to be able to plead and prove damages. In the case of
marine debris, especially debris on the high seas, the damages are
likely to be purely economic, without actual physical damage. The
debris may reduce the value of the waters where it is found as
recreational destinations; it may be able to be shown that fewer
people would want to dive, sail, motor, or simply look at waters
with lots of debris in them or in waters where the marine life may
have been reduced or altered as a result of debris. Nevertheless,
apart from the occasional instance of fouled rudders and
propellers, there may not be many instances of a plaintiff’s
property being damaged by marine debris. Certainly this is true
in the case of microplastics. However harmful they may be to
marine life, it is hard to imagine microplastics causing any
provable physical harm to a vessel, or its rigging, spars, and gear.
As a general matter, this presents a problem to stating a maritime
claim, as U.S. maritime law has long refused to grant damages for
purely economic loss in tort claims.84 The one exception to this
has been fishermen, to whom some courts have shown a special
solicitude, who have been allowed to collect damages from
(“It is unmistakable that the law of this circuit does not allow recovery of
purely economic claims absent physical injury to a proprietary interest in a
maritime negligence suit.”).
82. See Yarmouth Sea Prods. Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 395 (4th Cir.
1997); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
83. But cf. Louisiana Crawfish Producers Ass’n–West v. Associated Elec.
& Gas. Services, Ltd., No. 6:10–cv–348, 2011 WL 938766, at *6 (W.D. La.
Feb. 25, 2011) (considering claims by crawfish producers and agreeing with
the defendants, “that maritime law does not provide for enterprise or group
liability”); Louisiana Crawfish Producers Ass’n W. v. Assoc. Elec. & Gas Ins.
Servs. Ltd., No. CIV.A. 10-348, 2011 WL 947137 (W.D. La. Mar. 16, 2011).
To be sure crawfish producers, who raise crawfish in large inland ponds, are
arguably distinguishable from fishermen who go out onto the navigable
waters and the high seas.
84. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309–10 (1927).
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polluters in the absence of physical damage.85 Accordingly, if they
can identify a proper group of defendants and can prove damage to
their incomes as a result of marine debris, fishermen may be able
to bring an action against parties responsible for marine debris.
In order to take advantage of Rule B, that action will need to come
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the district
courts.86
C. An Admiralty or Maritime Claim
As set out above,87 the Supreme Court has held that for a tort
to come within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts, at
least in cases within the interior coastal waters of the United
States, the tort must satisfy the requirements of location and
nexus.88
1.

Location

To the extent that causing marine debris may constitute a
tort, demonstrating location for the tort would be trivial. The
debris is in the ocean whether coastal or in the high seas, and this
is where the wrong is consummated. Whether from land-based
run off or from a vessel, the marine debris will satisfy the location
test.
2.

Nexus

For a plaintiff suing a party responsible for marine pollution,
demonstrating nexus, especially the “significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity,”89 may be problematic.
For
plaintiffs, the most ready way of meeting the burden would be to
convince a court that it need not be born. A plaintiff could do this
by succeeding in the either or both the arguments that (1) because
the marine debris causing the damage were on the high seas, the
nexus test does not apply;90 or (2) the nexus test does not apply
because the complaint focuses on wrongdoing from a vessel on

85.
86.
87.
88.
(1986).
89.
90.

See Scully, 131 F.3d at 389; Oppen, 501 F.2d at 558.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 114-327).
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
See id.
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navigable water, and is within the arguably self-contained
jurisdictional grant of the Admiralty Extension Act.91 Meeting
the burden of showing a maritime nexus would, in some cases,
prove problematic.
a.

Potential to Disrupt Maritime Commerce

The first branch of the nexus test—that tortious activity have
a potential to disrupt maritime commerce,92—seems like it should
be fairly easily satisfied in most cases of marine debris.
Commercial fishing and all forms of recreation are significant
aspects of maritime commerce. To the extent that marine debris
can interfere with fishing and recreation, it has the potential to
disrupt maritime commerce. Indeed, courts have been willing to
accept marine pollution from vessels as well within the admiralty
jurisdiction as the pollution has the potential to disrupt maritime
commerce.93 It is the vessel, not the pollutants themselves, that
can provide the “significant relation to traditional maritime
activity.”94 How claims relating to marine pollution, including
marine debris, could come within the admiralty jurisdiction,
where the material ending up in the water is produced and
discharged on land could be problematic.
b.

Significant Relation to Traditional Maritime Activity

Where a vessel is transiting navigable waters and discharges
marine debris, there is an obvious relation to traditional maritime
activity. The carriage of cargo in and the discharge of waste by
vessels are as old as maritime commerce. However, where a
product is made on land, with the intent that it be used on land,
and is then distributed to and is discarded by a land-bound user, it
is difficult to describe what the producer or distributor has done in
producing or distributing marine debris, as related to traditional
maritime activity in any significant way. I think it is fair to say
that in such instances, the tortious activity of the producers and
distributors would not meet the nexus test. However, this failure

91. See id.
92. Quinn v. St. Charles Gaming Co., 815 So. 2d 963, 966 (La. Ct. App.
2002).
93. See In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1512 (D. Alaska 1991).
94. Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 352 (5th
Cir. 1999).
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only accentuates why the nexus test is inappropriate for torts on
the high seas.
If marine debris from products originally produced and
distributed on land causes damage on the high seas, it is the
general maritime law that should determine the liability for such
damage; that is, the general maritime law administered by courts,
state or federal, to cases that fall within the admiralty
jurisdiction.95 As noted above, under the traditional lex loci choice
of law rules,96 which a significant number of states still use, the
general maritime law is the only law that could apply to such
incidents.
CONCLUSION

Rule B, used to attach the personal property of, and obtain
jurisdiction over, absent defendants in maritime cases, could be a
useful tool in imposing liability on parties responsible for marine
debris. It is not, however, a panacea. There will be problems in
identifying defendants and proving damages. In addition, for the
marine debris produced from landward run-off there may be
significant jurisdictional barriers. While I have argued that
activity causing damage on the high seas should not be subject to
a maritime-nexus analysis in determining admiralty jurisdiction,
the issue is not decided, and courts may be reluctant to bring
activity far from land that was never directed at the sea within
the admiralty jurisdiction.
Still, if Rule B were used to bring parties responsible for
marine debris into federal district court, it could be highly
effective. Rule B would give a court both jurisdiction over a
responsible party and security for any judgment that might be
secured.

95. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
864–65 (1986) (explaining that, “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the
application of substantive admiralty law . . . . Drawn from state and federal
sources, the general maritime law is an amalgam of traditional common-law
rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules”) (citations
omitted).
96. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1051 (10th ed. 2014) (defining lex loci as
“[t]he law of the place; local law”).

